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Abstract
Determined cyber adversaries often strategize their
attacks by carefully selecting high-value target machines that
host insecure (e.g., unpatched) legacy software. In this
paper, we propose a moving-target approach to thwart and
countersurveil such adversaries, wherein live (non-decoy)
enterprise software services are automatically modified to
deceptively emulate vulnerable legacy versions that entice
attackers. A game-theoretic framework chooses which
emulated software stacks, versions, configurations, and
vulnerabilities yield the best defensive payoffs and most
useful threat data given a specific attack model. The results
show that effective movement strategies can be computed to
account for pragmatic aspects of deception, such as the
utility of various intelligence-gathering actions, impact of
vulnerabilities, performance costs of patch deployment,
complexity of exploits, and attacker profile.

1.

Introduction

Software vulnerabilities are among the top targets of
cyber criminals, corresponding to 25% of all exploitable
attack vectors [1]. The problem is exacerbated by the ready
availability of exploits and detailed bug reports, which
enable attackers to automate low-risk reconnaissance steps
and probe victim networks for these software flaws. When
a vulnerable target is identified, the attacker launches an
exploit to the unpatched server, such as one that hijacks
the victim software’s control-flow, causing it to perform
malicious actions on behalf of the attacker. The exploit
payload thereby obtains access to the environment and
deploys other malicious tools.
To anticipate and foil these directed cyber attacks,
deceptive honey-patching [2] has been proposed as a
language-based methodology to patch software security
vulnerabilities in such a way that future attempted exploits of
the patched vulnerability appear successful to attackers
even when they are not. This masks patching lapses,
impeding attackers from discerning which systems are
genuinely vulnerable and which are actually patched systems
masquerading as unpatched systems. Detected attacks
are surreptitiously redirected to isolated, unpatched decoy
environments with the full interactive power of the targeted
victim server. The decoy environments disinform adversaries
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with honey-data and aggressively monitor adversarial
behavior.
While these capabilities offer potentially promising
defense layers against determined adversaries skilled at
evading traditional honeypots, the question of which vulnerabilities to deceptively emulate or how to automatically
evolve the deceptive attack surface with evolving adversarial TTPs has remained relatively unstudied. For example,
Chameleon [3], Honeyd scripts [4], and Cloxy [5] deployments all presently rely upon human selection of
vulnerabilities and versions, which is sub-optimal for waging
long-term deceptive campaigns, because it can result in
deceptions becoming predictable and stale, potentially affording attackers the opportunity and time to fingerprint and
circumvent deceptive applications. As new vulnerabilities emerge, attack activity change [6, 7, 8, 9], potentially
rendering old deceptions less enticing to cyber criminals.
To overcome this disadvantage, this paper proposes
software deception steering as a new moving target defense
technique for counterreconnaissance and attack intelligence
gathering, which leverages application-level, deceptive attack
responses through honey-patching to continuously adapt the
deception surface of the target application. Toward this end,
we designed and implemented Q UICKSAND, an adaptive
software version emulation architecture, in which the set of
fake vulnerabilities is dynamically re-selected to increase the
likelihood of deceiving and entrapping attackers. Based
on vulnerability context (e.g., vulnerability risk scores,
attack history), Q UICKSAND chooses to emulate a particular
software version with a particular set of (fake) vulnerabilities.
This moving deception surface undermines the attacker’s
ability to identify and detect deceptions, and increases the
likelihood of gathering high-quality threat data reflective of
advanced attacks by skilled adversaries (rather than merely
well-known attacks by unskilled adversaries, for which threat
data is less useful).
Our work includes the following contributions:
• We propose a deception-based moving target architecture to dynamically honey-patch software, rendering it
less predictable and more robust against attackers’
anti-deception efforts.
• We model the software emulation process as a
Bayesian Stackelberg Game [10, 11] to compute
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effective movement strategies that account for pragmatic aspects of deception, including the utility of
intelligence-gathering actions, impact of vulnerabilities, cost of patch deployment, complexity of exploits,
and attacker model.
• We propose, design, and implement an effective
version-control strategy to facilitate patch re-selection
and automatically resolve source-level conflicts
between patches.

2.

Overview

First, we outline or new moving deception maneuver,
followed by primary challenges and corresponding design
decisions for software deception steering. Finally, we
summarize background literature and our threat model.

2.1.

Software Deception Steering

We define deception steering as the use of cyberdeception
for altering the apparent attack surface of software systems
towards configurations that yield better defender payoffs.
Specifically, leveraging vulnerability metadata and intrusion
alerts collected at the network perimeter, Q UICKSAND
dynamically adapts the target application to emulate a
particular software version, with a particular set of honeypatched vulnerabilities (and all other known vulnerabilities
regular-patched), a particular set of modules enabled, and a
particular guest OS version in decoys.
The scope of adaptation can go beyond the application
and host boundaries; for instance, perimeter defenses (if any)
can also be reconfigured to intentionally allow previously
filtered attacks to reach the honey-patch. This reconfiguration
need not happen live; it can be re-selected during nightly
reboots, for example. The selections are based on which
configuration is likely to gather the most useful threat data
given the history of past attacks.

2.2.

Design Principles

Software deception steering requires a patch management
framework that facilitates software version composition and
minimizes source code-level conflicts between patches.
Q UICKSAND defines honey-patches as modifications to their
corresponding regular, vendor-supplied patches. For instance,
Figure 1 exemplifies a vulnerability causing the GNU Bash
shell to improperly parse function definitions in the values of
environment variables [12]. Prior to the patch, the vulnerable
shell interpreter allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code or cause a denial of service on the victim’s machine.
The patch, named CVE-2014-6277 in this example, fixes the
vulnerability by extending the check for what constitutes a
legal function identifier to include some extra sanity checks
(Lines 2–3 in the patch code, depicted in diff style). The
honey-patch CVE-2014-6277-hp modifies the original patch
to fork attacks onto decoy environments while impersonating
the unpatched code (Lines 8–9 in the honey-patch code) to
deceive adversaries. Encoding honey-patches in this manner
naturally models the dependency among honey-patches, their

corresponding patches, and unpatched source code. It also
makes patch/honey-patch pairs conflict-free by construction,
greatly simplifying the task of composing new versions of
the target application.
Patch dependencies (denoted by dashed arrows between
patches) are calculated based on how patches affect source
code rather than by the order in which they are introduced
into the code base. This removes the temporal constraint
among patches and enables the selection of patch sets based
on their semantic dependencies. This patch dependency
model is implemented in the Darcs version control system
[13], which our software version-emulation architecture
leverages to select consistent, conflict-free application
versions for deployment.

2.3.

Background

Honey-patching. Prior work has observed that many
vendor-released software security patches can be honeyed by
replacing their attack-rejection responses with code that
instead maintains and forks the attacker’s connection to a
confined, unpatched decoy [2, 14]. Such honey-patching
retains the most complex part of the vendor patch (the
security check) and replaces the remediation code with some
boilerplate forking code [15], making it easy to implement
upon release of new security patches.
This embedded deception offers some important advantages over conventional honeypots. Most significantly, it
observes attacks against the defender’s genuine assets, not
merely those directed at fake assets that offer no legitimate
services. It can therefore capture data from sophisticated
attackers who monitor network traffic to identify serviceproviding assets before launching attacks, who customize
their attacks to the particular activities of targeted victims
(differentiating genuine servers from dedicated honeypots), and who may have already successfully infiltrated the
victim’s network before their attacks become detected.
Threat Model. Attackers in our model submit malicious
inputs intended to probe and exploit vulnerabilities on victim
networked services. We assume most attackers rely upon a
mix of vulnerabilities, only some of which are known to
defenders. For example, a skilled attacker might first try
to exploit known vulnerabilities, only escalating to more
potent, defender-unknown vulnerabilities (e.g., 0-days)
once he becomes confident that his activities are not being
observed. Attack payloads might be completely unique and
therefore unknown to defenders. Such payloads might elude
network-level monitors, and are therefore best detected at the
software level at the point of exploitation. We also assume
that attackers might use one payload for reconnaissance but
reserve another for the final attack. Misleading the attacker
into launching the final attack is useful for defenders to
discover the final attack payload, which can divulge attacker
TTPs and goals not discernible from the reconnaissance
payload alone.
While our general approach is potentially applicable to
arbitrary networked software, in this work we focus on
protecting services possessing strictly user-level privileges,
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CVE-2014-6277-hp
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...
if (legal_identifier (name))
…
else
{
last_command_exit_value = 1;
report_error (…);
}

1 ...
2 - if (legal_identifier (name))
3 + if (absolute_program (tname) && (posixly_correct == 0 || legal_identifier (tname)))
4 …
5 else
6 {
7
last_command_exit_value = 1;
8
report_error (…);
9 }
10

1 ...
2 if (absolute_program (tname) && (posixly_correct == 0 || legal_identifier (tname)))
3 …
4 else
5 {
6
last_command_exit_value = 1;
7 - report_error (…);
8 + hp_fork();
clones attack session to decoy environment
9 + hp_skip(report_error (…));
10 }

patch for CVE-2014-6277

CVE-2014-6277

honey-patch for CVE-2014-6277

Figure 1: Patch and honey-patch for CVE-2014-6277 (abbreviated), and dependencies between them denoted by dashed arrows
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Figure 2: An overview of Q UICKSAND.

Figure 3: A repository state showing patch dependencies.

and that must therefore leverage software bugs and kernelsupplied services to perform malicious actions, such as
corrupting the file system or accessing other users’ memory to
access confidential data. Q UICKSAND therefore instruments
user-level applications with deceptive defensive code without
modifying the OS or VM.

Definitions. The state of a repository is called a context. We
write oA a to denote that a repository moves from context
o to context a via patch A. Patches are usually stored
sequentially, and for any consecutive pair of patches, the
final state of the first patch must be identical to the initial
state of the second patch. A sequence of patches is written in
left to right order, such as oA aB b C c (or simply ABC if we
omit contexts). Parallel patches share a common initial
context and diverge to two different states (A ∨ B).

3.

System Design

Figure 2 depicts Q UICKSAND’s architecture. The patch
conflict solver generates conflict-free candidate patch sets for
version emulation. An analysis and correlation component
ingests and maintains vulnerability metadata from the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD), parses intrusion
alerts, and correlates them with intrusion signature metadata.
The patch set selector module leverages a game-theoretic
engine to select which version of the software should
be deployed based on the aggregated data. The version
deployment module then uses this information to synthesize
and deploy a new version of the application, including the
specification of the target modules and environment. This
process executes repeatedly, and its trigger threshold can
be fixed, random, or dynamically adjusted (e.g., based on
evidence and severity of intrusion alerts collected at the
network perimeter).
Patch Theory. Darcs is a change-based version control
system. In contrast to conventional history-based version
control systems (e.g., Subversion, Git, CVS), which represent
repository states as file trees, the state of a Darcs repository
is defined by the set of patches it contains. This facilitates a
cherry-picking operation—one that is not constrained by
temporal dependencies among patches—that adds flexibility
to our patch set selection model. Cherry-picking can be
defined in terms of Darcs’ underlying patch theory [16, 17],
summarized as follows:

Inversion. Every Darcs patch is invertible, affording the
application of patches in either forwards or backwards directions to reach a particular context: (AB)−1 = B −1 A−1 .
In particular, AA−1 has no effect, and (A−1 )−1 = A. Antiparallel patches have different initial states yielding the same
context (A−1 ∧ B −1 ).
Commutation. The commutation of patches A and B is
represented by AB ↔ B 0 A0 , where A0 and B 0 are intended
to perform the same change as A and B. Intermediate
states may differ however: oA aB b ↔ o B 0 xA0 b . A merge
operation is defined as a pairwise commutation, taking two
conflict-free parallel patches and converting them into a pair
of sequential patches: A ∨ B ⇒ AB 0 ↔ BA0 .
Cherry picking. Patch cherry picking refers to the ability
to pull patches from a repository regardless of the order
in which they were originally pushed into the repository.
To illustrate, consider the repository state depicted in
Figure 3. The repository consists of patches p1–p5, and the
changes made by each patch are summarized underneath
each patch. The dependencies between patches (denoted
by dashed arrows) are computed by Darcs. Figure 4a
illustrates cherry picking for this particular example. Pulling
patches p1, p2, and p5 from the source onto the destination
repository automatically adjusts the selected patches to fit the
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Figure 4: Operations illustrating (a) change-based patch cherry picking, (b) patch obliteration and consistency, and (c) patch management:
patch set B denotes the set of patches making up the base source code of the software; patch dependencies pointing to it have been omitted.

new context (without p3 and p4). Darcs performs such
adjustments using its patch manipulation algebra to allow
users to reason about patches as sets, despite patches being
stored as sequences internally.
Patch obliteration and consistency. Another advantage
of patch commutativity is that patches can be obliterated
(undone) without rolling back patches that historically
succeed them. In the example above, patch p4 can be
removed from the repository without undoing p5, as
illustrated in Figure 4b. To accomplish this, Darcs rearranges
the sequence of patches by commuting p4 with p5, and
then removes p4. However, Darcs does not allow p3 to be
removed without first undoing p4; allowing this operation
would constitute a patch dependency violation and render the
state of the repository inconsistent.
Patch Management. Figure 4c illustrates our patch management strategy. Regular patches are pushed (stored) into
Darcs repositories base and hp, and honey-patches are
stored into repository hp only. We call B the set of patches
(i.e., all code changes) that constitute the base version of
the software (e.g., the initial commit, a specific tagged
version of the application containing all patches up to the
tag). Candidate versions selected by the path selection
module are stored as tags (e.g., v1–vn) by pulling specific
patch sets from hp, which allows them to be easily retrieved
for version deployment.
This patch management strategy leverages the underlying
Darcs infrastructure, which automatically computes the
transitive dependency relations for any given patch selection.
For example, when pulling honey-patch p4-hp, Darcs
correctly pulls patch set B and patches p3, p4, and p4-hp.
This has the advantage of enabling a much simpler patch set
generation algorithm (see §4).
Alert Analysis and Correlation. The alert analysis and
correlation workflow pre-processes vulnerability and environmental data to generate contextual information for patch
set selection. First, intrusion alerts are parsed, and each
alert class is annotated with descriptive statistics and target
information. In the second step, the correlation module

Listing 1: Alert object containing threat metadata
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

{ cveID: CVE−2014−6277,
targets: {('192.168.134.150', 80), ('192.168.134.139', 8080), ...},
cvss: { 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/...'},
cwe: { id: 'cwe−78', term: 'OS Command Injection' },
cpe: { 'cpe:/a:gnu:bash:2.02.1', 'cpe:/a:gnu:bash:2.01.1', ...},
published: 2014−09−24T14:48:04.477−04:00,
public exploit: 'yes',
count: 115 }

parses the intrusion detection system’s signature map to
extract the signature information for each alert object and
cross-references it with the corresponding CVE identification
derived from the reference field specified in the alert metadata. This step additionally filters intrusion alerts whose
signatures target vulnerabilities that have not been identified
as CVEs. The last step consults vFeed [18] to look up
common vulnerability and exploit databases (e.g., CVSS,
CWE, exploit-db) to aggregate threat intelligence metadata
(e.g., vulnerability risk scores, exploit availability) and alert
objects, which are used by the game-theoretic decision engine during the version selection process. Listing 1 shows an
alert object containing threat metadata for CVE-2014-6277.

4.

Software Deception Steering

To enable a truly dynamic system that makes it difficult
for an adversary to fingerprint a deployed patch, Q UICK SAND’s patch selection process is built atop a moving target’s
defense-in-depth strategy combining cyber agility and honeypatching. In the context of software deception steering cyber
maneuvers, we discuss the three components of this defense
strategy [19]: configuration set C, timing function T , and
movement strategy M .

4.1.

Configuration Set

The effectiveness of software deception steering depends
on the selection of a set of code versions (with honeypatches) that can be deployed at any point in time. This
requires each code version to be conflict-free.
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Data: Π: patch set, B: base repository, HP : honey-patch
repository
Result: set of conflict-free patch sets
cs ← ∅
∆←B
for (p1 , p2 ) ∈ Π2 do
begin
if ¬pull({p1 , p2 }, HP , ∆) then
begin
cs ← cs ∪ {(p1 , p2 )}
end
obliterate('[.*]-hp$', ∆)
end
remove(∆)
return {S ∈ ℘(Π) | S 2 ∩ cs = ∅}

Figure 5: Conflict-free patch set generation algorithm

Conflict-free Code Versions. A conflict in our system is
defined by the following syntactic rule: if (honey-)patch A
and (honey-)patch B prescribe different contents for the
same line of code, then A and B cannot coexist automatically
in the same code version. A code version can be viewed as
an element in the power-set of patches, i.e., v ∈ ℘(Π). Thus,
pruning this power set based on the pair-wise definition of
conflict between patches results in the configuration set C
for the MTD.
Figure 5 details (in pseudocode) the algorithm for
generating conflict-free code versions (or patch-sets) given
the inputs Π representing the set of available security patches,
the base repository B containing regular patches, and the
repository HP of honey-patches. Lines 1–2 initializes the
conflict-set cs to be empty, and a temporary repository
∆ as a copy of B. The algorithm then populates cs with
all conflicting patch pairs ∈ Π × Π (or Π2 ) by checking
the result of merging the corresponding honey-patch pair
from HP into ∆ and then resetting ∆ between each merge
operation (lines 3–10). Line 11 removes the temporary
repository. Finally, in Line 12 the set of conflict-free patch
sets is generated by pruning out all code versions from ℘(Π)
that contain conflict-pairs. While complex pruning rules
(such as constraining honey-patches to be applicable only
to releases officially reported in the Common Platform
Enumerations database) can be specified, it reduces the
cardinality of the configuration set and therefore the available
options for the cyber maneuver.

4.2.

Timing Function

Q UICKSAND uses an event-based timing function T
[19]. In this setting, when alerts are triggered by our system,
we use it to compute the existence of a particular attacker
type (discussed in the next section) and adapt our current
deception strategy given this knowledge. In scenarios where
alerts are ubiquitous, we consider a hybrid T that uses
aggregate alert information over a time-period to modify the
movement strategy.

4.3.

Game-theoretic Movement Function

Given the set of conflict-free code versions, the system
must decide which is to be deployed at the time of switching.
To this end, we first consider a game-theoretic modeling of
the interaction between an adversary and Q UICKSAND.
Then, we define an optimal deception selection strategy and
describe methods to compute it.
In real-world settings, defenders often target adversaries
having a particular set of characteristics. Curating the patch
set selection strategy to the nuances of this adversarial
profile thus results in more effective countermeasures. For
example, it is ineffective to honey-patch only older, nearly
obsolete vulnerabilities to gather threat intelligence about
expert adversaries armed with the newest exploits. To
address this concern, we model the problem as a two-player
Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG) inspired by prior MTD
web defense models [11].
Our BSG can be defined as a tuple hD, A, AD ,
A
A , U D , U A , P i, where D denotes the defender, A =
{A1 , . . . , Aθ } denotes the θ types of attacker, AD and
A
AA = {AA
1 , . . . , Aθ } denote the action-sets A of the players, U D = {U1D , . . . , UθD } and U A = {U1A , . . . , UθA }
denote their utilities (with the subscripts representing the
utility of the players corresponding to the adversary’s type),
and P = {P1 , . . . , Pθ } denotes a probability distribution
that represents the likelihood of facing each attacker type.
Our goal is to derive a robust deception strategy that works
well, in expectation, against all attacker types. Next we
discuss how each of these model parameters are obtained
and use real-world examples to elucidate the descriptions.
Players (D, A). The defender D represents the administrator who sets up the system, inspects reported alerts, and
chooses to deploy a particular deception measure. The
attacker A has three types according to skill set level—script
kiddie (A1 ), early adopter (A2 ), and APT attacker (A3 ). As
the names suggest, A3 is an expert who spends time in
identifying vulnerabilities against a system, whereas A1 only
uses attacks that have publicly available implementation of
exploits, and A2 is biased towards exploits that are trending.
A more formal distinction follows in our discussion of player
action sets.
Actions (A). The defender’s actions AD = C =
{v1 , . . . , vn } consist of the n feasible candidate patch-sets
found using the algorithm in Figure 5. A defender can
choose any of these actions (also referred to as a pure strategy) at any point in time. Given the patch sets used by
the defender, we compile a list of known exploits E that
can be used by an attacker. We enumerate the exploits
against our system in Table 1 and consider subsets of E, using the published and the public exploit fields
in the metadata object of the exploit (see Listing 1), to
describe the exploits available to each attacker type.
The script-kiddie’s (A1 ) attack set consists of CVEs that
have a known public exploit available. The early-adopter’s
(A2 ) attack set comprises vulnerabilities that have a public
exploit available for which the published date is less than
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Table 1: Summary of (honey-)patchable vulnerabilities with corresponding CVSS scores.
Vulnerability

Description

CVSS

Software

CVE-2014-0160

Information leak

Openssl

CVE-2012-1823

System remote hijack

PHP

CVE-2011-3368

Port scanning

Apache

CVE-2014-6271

System hijack

Bash

CVE-2014-6277

System hijack

Bash

CVE-2014-0224

Session hijack and information leak

Openssl

CVE-2010-0740

DoS via NULL pointer dereference

Openssl

CVE-2010-1452

DoS via request that lacks a path

Apache

CVE-2016-6515

DoS via request that lacks a path

OpenSSH

CVE-2016-7054

DoS via heap buffer overflow

Openssl

CVE-2017-5941

System hijack

Node.js

CVE-2017-7494

System hijack

Samba

Impact (I)

Exploitability (E)

Overall (O)

5.4

3.7

8.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:H/RL:O/RC:C/CR:H/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:H/MI:N/MA:N

3.4
1.4

UiA (v, e) =

+riD (v, e) − c(v) if e-hp ⊂ v
−I D (e) − c(v)
otherwise



−riA (v, e) − c(e) if e-hp ⊂ v
+I A (e) − c(e)
otherwise

3.5

4.8

6.1

3.7

9.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C/CR:H/IR:H/AR:H/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:C/MC:H/MI:H/MA:H

6.1

3.7

9.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C/CR:H/IR:H/AR:H/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:C/MC:H/MI:H/MA:H

5.9

2.1

7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C/CR:H/IR:H/AR:X/MAV:N/MAC:H/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:X/MC:H/MI:H/MA:X

2.1

3.5

5.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L/E:P/RL:O/RC:C/CR:X/IR:X/AR:H/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:N/MI:N/MA:L

1.4

3.5

4.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L/E:P/RL:O/RC:C/CR:X/IR:X/AR:M/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:N/MI:N/MA:X

5.4

3.7

8.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C/CR:X/IR:X/AR:H/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:N/MI:N/MA:H

5.4

3.7

8.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C/CR:X/IR:X/AR:H/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:N/MUI:N/MS:X/MC:X/MI:X/MA:H

Utilities (U ). To design the utility for the players, we
primarily consider metrics that are a part of the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSSv3) [20]. We first
define a generic reward structure and discuss how it can
capture the various aspects of cyber deception. Then, we
highlight how we can obtain numeric values that represent
the utility of the players.
The utility structure for a player, given that defender D
deploys code version v and attacker Ai executes an exploit
e ∈ Ei , is as follows:


7.0
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4.0

In the first case, where the code version deployed has a
honey-patch for exploit e that the attacker decides to exploit,
the reward for the defender has two components. First, D
gets a positive reward of riD (v, e) because the attacker Ai
was trapped using the honey-patch. This value is specific to
the exploit being honey-patched as it needs to account for its
intelligence-gathering worth (e.g., IPs used by the attacker)

3.7
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t = 5 years. Thus, A2 ’s attack set includes the last two
CVEs in the list shown in Table 1 (i.e. |E2 | = 4). The APT
attacker (A3 ) can write exploits for any of the existing
CVEs in the list, and has all the attack actions available (i.e.
|E3 | = |E| = 12).

UiD (v, e) =

3.7
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combined with the actionable protective measures that can
be taken (e.g., add such IPs to the firewall deny-list). In this
regard, given the attacks in our system, we consider the following ordering: riD (v, DoS) ≤ riD (v, Port Scanning) <
riD (v, Info Leakage) < riD (v, System Hijacking).
While the reward structure can encode context-specific
information about the operating environment (e.g., value
of targeted assets, mission critical requirements) or the
attacks (e.g., targeted port-scanning, distributed vs. targeted
DoS), we do not make such fine-grained distinctions as the
production context isn’t fully defined. This allows us to
disregard the equality condition in the first inequality relating
to the DoS and port-scanning vulnerabilities; we design
uniformly spaced rewards in the range [0, maxe I D (e)].
Second, the value c(v) represents the cost of deploying a
particular honey-patch on the Quality of Service (QoS)
metrics on a system. We assume that all conflict-free
patch sets v have the same cost (i.e. these values cannot
incentivize D to pick a particular code version based on QoS
metrics) but can consider a nuanced value for c(v) when this
distinction becomes necessary.
Attacker Ai , when trapped by a honey-patch, incurs the
cost of crafting and executing the exploit c(e). This cost is
dependent on the complexity of an attack (represented by
its exploitability score) and the temporal metrics (what
kind of an exploit or patch is available and how reliable the
source is). Thus, we multiply the exploitability score (ES) of
CVSS with the temporal metrics to obtain c(e), similar to
the way temporal scores are obtained using the CVSS’s base
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score (BS). The other negative reward riA (v, e) captures D
gaining knowledge of an attacker’s TTPs. In our model, we
assume that the attacker is unaware of which vulnerabilities
are honey-patched, and thus riA (v, e) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , θ}.
One may choose to assign different scores to different
players. For example, this can be used to reflect the fact
that an APT attacker (A3 ) is better equipped to detect the
deception.
In the second case, when v does not contain a honeypatch for e, the attacker can either gain reconnaissance if a
regular patch is deployed by leveraging the attack failure
information, or cause full impact without getting caught if no
regular patches are available (for relatively new CVEs). For
the latter case, D receives a negative utility against Ai with
magnitude equal to the impact score, while Ai receives a
positive utility with magnitude equal to the overall score.
The overall score trades off the impact of the attack with the
complexity of constructing and executing it. Table 1 shows
the CVSSv3 metrics corresponding to the individual exploits
of the formulated game, leveraged to calculate the utilities.
For the former case, D’s loss is a fraction of the impact
score for giving out attacker info, whereas Ai considers its
effort cost and the utility of gathering the information about
patches.
Attacker Type Probabilities (P ). We start with an initial
probability distribution over attacker types (denoted as
hPr(A1 ), . . . , Pr(Aθ )i) that can be obtained by analysis
of historical data (from similar systems) by security experts.
Over repeated interactions, we can utilize an alert a raised by
the analysis and correlation module to update the attacker
type probabilities Pi as follows.
Pi = Pr(Ai |a) = Pr(Ai ) · Pr(a|Ai )
X
= α Pr(Ai ) ·
P r(a|e) · Pr(e|Ai )
e

= α Pr(Ai ) ·

X

P r(a|e) · I(e ∈ Ai )

e

where α represents the normalization factor and I represents
an indicator function that equals 1 if the condition is met or
0 otherwise. The value Pr(e|Ai ) should ideally represent
the strategy of an attacker type if they were to behave
rationally. However, an alert may be observed for any of the
available exploits, even when it is a sub-optimal choice
for a rational adversary; we account for this irrationality
by using the indicator function. Further, if an alert is
generated by multiple exploit actions e, an attacker type
with larger number of such exploits should be assigned
higher probability. Lastly, while some alert systems, such as
anomaly detection systems based on machine learning, may
detect certain exploits imperfectly, we limit ourselves to
deterministic detection mechanisms.
As an example, consider the use of a CVE from 2014
that is distinctive in observing a particular system alert.
Given A2 cannot perform this attack action, P2 becomes
zero. This probability is distributed between P3 and P1 , as

A1 or A3 may have generated this alert. Thus, the initial
distribution h0.4, 0.4, 0.2i becomes h0.67, 0, 0.33i after
the first interaction with the attacker.

4.4.

Strategy Computation

A strong threat model must account for an adversary
capable of performing target reconnaissance. In gametheoretic terms, this boils down to the use of Stackelberg
Equilibrium, which encodes the assumption that the defender
acts as a leader while the attacker, who takes the role
of a follower, is aware of the defender’s deployment
strategy [11, 21]. In this setting, the defender plays a mixed
strategy (i.e., a probabilistic strategy over his actions) making
it impossible for the attacker to fingerprint the deception
strategy in place at any given point in time. In this Bayesian
Stackelberg Game setting, we can calculate the optimal
movement strategy (~x) for the defender by maximizing D’s
expected utility, as follows,
XXX
i

v

Pi xv qei UiD (v, e)

(1)

e

where each attacker Ai ’s strategy ~qi is calculated with
the knowledge
of the defender’s strategy ~x by maximizP P
ing e v xv qei UiA , subjected to constraints that ~qi
represents a probability distribution. Both optimizations—
maximizing the defender’s expected utility given the attacker
maximizing their utility—can be folded into a single DOBSS
mixed integer linear program [10]. We use this formulation
for calculating the strategy of version emulation in Q UICK SAND. At the start of each time period, we use this mixed
strategy to select a particular code version at random and
proceed with its deployment.
Version Deployment. Upon completion of patch selection,
Q UICKSAND deploys a new version of the application into
the target environment. Figure 2 outlines the steps taken to
deploy an application. The first step consists of creating a
working repository for the application, by first pulling all
patches from base into target, and then pulling only the
selected honey-patch subset into target. This yields a
working repository state that is tagged with the selected
application version. The final step consists of building
the target application from sources, using a user-supplied
configuration as supplemental input. The configuration
parameters are specified per application, as shown in the
configuration file illustrated in Listing 2, to set up the build
environment and release the new application version.

5.

Implementation

We developed an implementation of Q UICKSAND for the
64-bit version of Linux. The implementation consists of four
Python components: the repository handler module consists
of about 150 lines of code and wraps Darcs CLI [17] to offer
an API to access the version control system. The analyzer
component consists of 90 lines of code, and leverages
py-idstools [22] to parse IDS signature maps and events
sourced in unified2 format (a serialized binary stream format
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Listing 2: Q UICKSAND example configuration file
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Table 2: Summary of conflict-free patch versions (-hp implied)

[Apache−1]
app = apache
base repo = ../data/base
hp repo = ../data/hp
deploy repo = ../data/deploy
configure command = make
install command = make install
patches = CVE−2014−0160:CVE−2014−6271: \
CVE−2014−6277:CVE−2014−7169: ...

#

Patch Set

Affected Software (CPE)

1

CVE-2014-0160

openssl:1.0.1f (≤)

2

CVE-2014-6271,
CVE-2014-6277

bash:[4.3, 3.2.48, 2.0.5, 1.14.7] (≤)

3

CVE-2014-0160,
CVE-2014-6271,
CVE-2014-6277

openssl:1.0.1f (≤),
bash:[4.3, 3.2.48, 2.0.5, 1.14.7] (≤)

[Apache−2]
app = apache
...

4

CVE-2010-1452

http server:2.2.15 (≤)

5

CVE-2011-3368

http server:[2.2.21,2.0.64,1.3.68] (≤)

6

CVE-2010-1452,
CVE-2011-3368

http server:2.2.15 (≤)

7

CVE-2012-1823

php:[5.4.1, 5.3.10] (≤)

8

CVE-2016-6515

openssh:7.2 (≤)

9

CVE-2014-0224

openssl:[1.0.1f,1.0.0l,0.9.8y] (≤)

10

CVE-2014-0160,
CVE-2014-0224

openssl:1.0.1f (≤)

11

CVE-2010-0740

openssl:0.9.8m (≤)

12

CVE-2010-0740,
CVE-2014-0224

openssl:0.9.8m (≤)

13

CVE-2016-6515,
CVE-2014-0224

openssh:7.2 (≤),
openssl:1.0.1f (≤)

14

CVE-2016-6515,
CVE-2010-0740

openssh:7.2 (≤),
openssl:0.9.8m (≤)

15

CVE-2016-6515,
CVE-2014-0224,
CVE-2010-0740

openssh:7.2 (≤),
openssl:0.9.8m (≤)

16

CVE-2017-5941

node-serialize:0.0.4 (≤)

17

CVE-2017-7494

samba:[4.1.23, 4.0.26,3.6.25,3.5.22] (≤)

[OpenSSL]
app = openssl
...

specification for IDS events), and vFeed [18] to fetch and
aggregate threat metadata to alert objects. The patch selector
module consists of an additional 140 lines of code, and the
version deployment module adds about 80 lines of code to
the system. Our implementation depends on a deployment
environment that has been pre-configured with a honeypatching framework, along with its process sandboxing and
monitoring facilities [2].

5.1.

Conflict-free Patch Sets

Table 2 summarizes the conflict-free patch sets used
as inputs to our game-theoretic decision process. These
serve as candidate versions for patch selection, and encode
information about affected software, such as application
version compatibility. Each patch set implicitly encodes the
availability of regular (e.g., CVE-2017-7494) and honey
(e.g., CVE-2017-7494-hp) patch selections. Moreover, our
patch repository maintains patch metadata that is used to
filter unpatchable patch sets—patch selections for which a
version deployment is infeasible due to patch compatibility
and operation requirements.

5.2.

Simulation Results

Table 3 highlights simulation results obtained using three
different movement strategies: static deception, uniform
random strategy (URS), and Bayesian Stackelberg Game
(BSG). For simulation, we assume that the four latest
vulnerabilities cannot be patched due to lack of officially
available patches; the defender faces maximum impact
for these and smaller impact for other vulnerabilities that
are regularly patched due to leakage of reconnaissance
information. The reward values for the defender shown in
Table 3 are plotted across 12 different runs. In each run, we
consider a distinct exploit is detected and update the beliefs
over the attacker types accordingly.
In comparison to a static strategy that deploys the most
profitable honey-patch set, software deception steering,
regardless of employed movement strategy, increases system
administrators’ expected utility. Although, in our game
setup, the use of uniform random strategy (URS) (i.e.,
selecting either of the 17 versions with equal probability at

Table 3: Benefits of different patch selection strategies.

Strategy
Static
URS
BSG

Expected Utility ↑

# Patch-sets used ↓

−5.87
−1.66 ± 0.81
−1.26 ± 0.89

1
17
11

deployment time) is sub-optimal when compared to the
Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium strategy. Further, the
game-theoretic strategy identifies 6 code-versions devoid
of security benefits, significantly reducing the defender’s
overhead of maintaining all 17 patch-sets. While the patchsets #12 and #14 are pruned-out as #15 is a strict-subset,
we also notice path-set #13 has a non-zero deployment
probability. The patch-sets {1, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14} are assigned
zero-probability of deployment. Among the patch-sets that
have non-zero probabilities of deployment (on average
across the 12 runs), 5 of them have the highest deployment
probability of 14.4% and the patch-set #7 has the lowest
deployment probability of 1.1%.
While our game parameters are based on simulation
results over rewards obtained from security databases,
human-subject case studies must be conducted to understand
the true benefits of this model. In the future, we plan to
validate Q UICKSAND under these three movement strategies
in empirical attack-defense exercises.
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6.

Future Work

Experimental validation. Q UICKSAND is an ongoing
project, and future work is planned to fully evaluate our
software version emulation strategy. We tested our approach
on an experimental setup comprising virtual machines
pre-configured for honey-patching [2]. Prior work has
examined performance characteristics and the effectiveness
of honey-patching [23, 14, 2] for cyberdeception.
We plan to empirically evaluate our approach based
on a testing harness that streams the system synthetically
generated, labeled attack data derived from real network
traffic logs [24]. The labeled data will provide a ground truth
to assign performance scores for each software-version
generated by Q UICKSAND, in a realistic and repeatable
manner. Toward this goal, we plan to collect a pool of honeypatched vulnerabilities for highly-targeted server applications
and libraries and craft exploit scripts to inject attacks into the
regular traffic for the evaluation. Once we have gathered
labeled data from our tests, we will extract features from the
data set and tune Q UICKSAND’s version ranking function.
Human-subject evaluation. We also plan to leverage
human-subject experimentation to evaluate our techniques.
To this end, we are currently designing attack-defense
capture-the-flag (CTF) exercises to assess the effectiveness
of different deception configurations against human attackers.
The goal is to use CTF data to derive realistic set points for
our game-theoretic model.

7.

Related Work

Cyber Agility. Moving target defenses (MTDs) [25] seek to
thwart attacks by mutating or evolving digital environments
faster than adversaries can adapt. MTD can be viewed
as a subclass of the broader field of cyber agility [26],
which includes any reasoned modification to a system or
environment in response to a functional, performance, or
security need. Such approaches sometimes benefit from
deceptive ploys that can impede adversarial adaptation to the
defense, but deception is not a requirement for agility or
MTD to be effective—if the cyber-maneuver is faster than
the enemy can react, the defense can be effective without any
deceptive element.
MTD techniques can be broadly classified into host-based
approaches, such as address space layout randomization [27,
28, 29], instruction set randomization [30], multi-variant
execution environments [31], and network-based approaches,
including address hopping [32, 33, 34], dynamic routes [35],
and dynamic topology [36]. Using a typical attack kill
chain (e.g., reconnaissance, access, development, launch,
and persistence) as a taxonomy, the primary focus of hostbased approaches is on development and launch phases,
while network-based techniques focus primarily on the
reconnaissance phase. This is useful for accommodating
multiple threat models and designing evaluation strategies
for each technique (e.g., overhead to perform reconnaissance
and map a network topology).
Many of these agile defenses can benefit from deception
(e.g., using network decoys to affect the perceived topology

of an enterprise network to impede reconnaissance). Dually,
good deceptions are often agile (i.e., their performance
characteristics are indistinguishable from the target they
impersonate), therefore creating a reverse synergy between
such technologies. Our work benefits from research advances
in MTD and extends the class of possible cyber maneuvers
with a new mechanism based on software deception to
inform the adaptation process.
Game-Theoretic Defense-in-Depth. MTD has been used
to augment existing cyber systems with defense-in-depth.
These efforts can be organized based on the cyber surfaces
they move [19]. Our work introduces a new deceptive cyber
maneuver for honey-patching that thwarts exploits on the
exploration surface (e.g., probing) and on the attack surface
(e.g., system hijacking). Heuristic movement strategies have
been shown to be detrimental to the performance of these
dynamic systems, leading us to take a principled approach
that models the cyber-interaction as a game to create optimal
movement strategies [37, 38, 21]. While we leverage
existing security knowledge in publicly available databases
(similar to [11]), we also consider contextual information and
highlight important future research directions for developing
a language-based approach and security metrics for cyberdeception. Unlike conventional MTD approaches that
showcase effectiveness of toy domains and simulation
environments [19, section IV], our work discusses a concrete
architecture and a deployment model for enhancing enterprise
security operations with cyber deception.

8.

Conclusion

Our approach enhances vulnerability patching with a
moving target defense technique that makes applications less
predictable and more robust against attackers anti-deception
efforts. Toward this end, we designed and implemented an
adaptive, software version-emulation architecture in which
the set of honey-patched vulnerabilities in a target application
is dynamically re-selected to increase the likelihood of
deceiving and entrapping attackers. Leveraging a gametheoretic analysis that automates and optimizes (honey-)patch
management, our framework computes effective movement
strategies based on contextual threat metadata and attacker
model.
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Z. Zhao, M. Taguinod, and G.-J. Ahn, “A game theoretic
approach to strategy generation for moving target defense
in web applications.,” in Proceedings of the International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS), 2017.
[12] NIST, “Vulnerability summary for CVE-2014-6277,” 2014.
[13] D. Roundy, “Darcs: Distributed version management in
Haskell,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on
Haskell, 2005.
[14] F. Araujo, M. Shapouri, S. Pandey, and K. Hamlen, “Experiences with honey-patching in active cyber security education,”
in Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Cyber Security
Experimentation and Test (CSET), 2015.
[15] F. Araujo and K. W. Hamlen, “Compiler-instrumented,
dynamic secret-redaction of legacy processes for attacker
deception,” in Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2015.
[16] I. Lynagh, “An algebra of patches,” tech. rep., University of
Oxford, 2006.
[17] Darcs, “Darcs version control system,” 2016.
[18] Toolswatch, “vFeed – The correlated vulnerability and threat
database,” 2016.
[19] S. Sengupta, A. Chowdhary, A. Sabur, A. Alshamrani,
D. Huang, and S. Kambhampati, “A survey of moving
target defenses for network security,” IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials, 2020.
[20] FIRST, “Common vulnerability scoring system.” www.
first.org/cvss, June 2019.
[21] S. Sengupta, A. Chowdhary, D. Huang, and S. Kambhampati,
“Moving target defense for the placement of intrusion
detection systems in the cloud,” in International Conference
on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), 2018.
[22] Py-idstools, “Py-idstools Python library,” 2016.

[23] X. Han, N. Kheir, and D. Balzarotti, “Evaluation of deceptionbased web attacks detection,” in Proceedings of the Workshop
on Moving Target Defense, 2017.
[24] G. Ayoade, F. Araujo, K. Al-Naami, A. M. Mustafa, Y. Gao,
K. W. Hamlen, and L. Khan, “Automating cyberdeception
evaluation with deep learning,” in Proceedings of the 53rd
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS),
2020.
[25] S. Jajodia, A. K. Ghosh, V. Swarup, C. Wang, and X. S. Wang,
Moving Target Defense: Creating Asymmetric Uncertainty for
Cyber Threats, vol. 54. Springer Science & Business Media,
2011.
[26] P. McDaniel, T. Jaeger, T. F. La Porta, N. Papernot, R. J.
Walls, A. Kott, L. Marvel, A. Swami, P. Mohapatra, S. V.
Krishnamurthy, and I. Neamtiu, “Security and science of
agility,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Moving
Target Defense (MTD), 2014.
[27] C. Kil, J. Jun, C. Bookholt, J. Xu, and P. Ning, “Address
space layout permutation (ASLP): Towards fine-grained
randomization of commodity software,” in Proceedings of the
22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC), 2006.
[28] E. D. Berger and B. G. Zorn, “DieHard: Probabilistic memory
safety for unsafe languages,” in Proceedings of the 27th
ACM Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI), 2006.
[29] V. Iyer, A. Kanitkar, P. Dasgupta, and R. Srinivasan, “Preventing overflow attacks by memory randomization,” in
Proceedings of the 21st IEEE International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2010.
[30] K. Onarlioglu, L. Bilge, A. Lanzi, D. Balzarotti, and E. Kirda,
“G-Free: Defeating return-oriented programming through
gadget-less binaries,” in Proceedings of the 26th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2010.
[31] B. Salamat, T. Jackson, A. Gal, and M. Franz, “Orchestra:
Intrusion detection using parallel execution and monitoring of
program variants in user-space,” in Proceedings of the 4th
ACM European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys),
2009.
[32] E. Al-Shaer, “Toward network configuration randomization
for moving target defense,” in Moving Target Defense
(S. Jajodia, A. K. Ghosh, V. Swarup, C. Wang, and X. S.
Wang, eds.), Springer, 2011.
[33] T. E. Carroll, M. Crouse, E. W. Fulp, and K. S. Berenhaut,
“Analysis of network address shuffling as a moving target
defense,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC), 2014.
[34] J. H. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan, “Openflow random
host mutation: Transparent moving target defense using
software defined networking,” in Proceedings of the 1st
Workshop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networks
(HotSDN), 2012.
[35] S. T. Trassare, R. Beverly, and D. Alderson, “A technique for
network topology deception,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), 2013.
[36] P. Kampanakis, H. Perros, and T. Beyene, “SDN-based
solutions for moving target defense network protection,” in
Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on a World
of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM),
2014.
[37] K. M. Carter, J. F. Riordan, and H. Okhravi, “A game
theoretic approach to strategy determination for dynamic
platform defenses,” in Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on
Moving Target Defense (MTD), 2014.
[38] A. Clark, K. Sun, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “A
game-theoretic approach to IP address randomization in
decoy-based cyber defense,” in International Conference on
Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), 2015.

Page 1997

